This paper examines the justification of populism by navigating through the theoretical arguments between conventional theories and agonistic theories of democracy. Within conventional theories, populism occupies an ambiguous position. It is viewed simultaneously as the vital energy of democratic self-rule and as a threat to the institutional mechanisms of polyarchy. The irresolution brought by such a dilemma implies a demand to recognise the political good inherent in human conflicts and the potential for refounding they offer as an alternative source of justification proposed by agonistic theorists. However, not all theories within the paradigm of agonistic democracy have provided a comprehensive analysis of populism. Chantal Mouffe's endorsement of left-wing populism places populism within a liberal-pluralist framework, stripping populism of its radical transformative force. Similarly, William Connolly's ethos of critical response allows populism to challenge the fundamentalism of the established (liberal) order while doubting populism's own tendency towards fundamentalism. The problem here is that such a framework lacks the evaluative criteria necessary to adjudicate between the advantages and disadvantages of populism, thereby diminishing the agency of political actors. Lastly, drawing upon the work of Mark Wenman, the paper situates the justification of populism within the framework of constituent power which utilised the conflicts, brought about by populism in this context, to refound the constituted political order. The paper concludes with the argument that populism constitutes a positive good as a strategy for political actors insofar as it represents the constituent power that challenges the constituted order and proposes alternative proposals, ensuring that the political realm remains a site of perpetual struggle and creative agency.
Shengkai Zhang (Sat,) studied this question.