What Mary Really Learned: A Structural Interpretation of the Knowledge Argument Through the Theory of Axiomatic Necessity

Frank Jackson's famous Knowledge Argument, commonly known as Mary's Room, remains one of the most influential challenges to physicalism. The central question is deceptively simple: if Mary knows every physical fact about color while living in a monochromatic environment, does she learn something genuinely new when she first experiences the color red? This paper proposes a structural reinterpretation of the argument using the Theory of Axiomatic Necessity (TNA). Rather than viewing Mary's discovery as the acquisition of new factual information or merely a new cognitive ability, we argue that it represents a transition between two structurally distinct domains. Physical knowledge belongs to the operational domain (N₀), whereas conscious experience requires access to an admissibility domain (N₁) that cannot be generated solely through operational descriptions. Within this framework, Mary's first perception of red is interpreted as a structural transition governed by the TNA operator Ψ, which maps operationally represented states into admissible conscious experience. Consequently, the Knowledge Argument becomes another instance of the TNA Closure Theorem: no operational system can derive its complete admissibility conditions from within itself.