Study designs data-driven controllers to mitigate false data injection attacks in cyber physical systems, indicating a new approach to security.
Among the diverse forms of cyber-attacks, false data injection (FDI) attacks are prone to occur and have become prominent threats. The present paper is concerned with the design of data-driven controllers of unknown cyber physical systems (CPSs) subjected to FDI attacks, using input-state data but no model knowledge. A core aspect of this issue revolves around the modelling of unknown FDI attacked system in the context of data-driven control. To solve the problem, we formulate an FDI attacks as a convex optimisation problem using the H2-norm, a FDI attacks channel model, and stability constraints. First, based on the input-state data sequences, the optimal feedback control law is designed to minimise the H2-norm of the closed-loop system's transfer function. The attacker's capability is modelled as a bounded constraint on attack power. The Schur complement lemma and a regularisation term provide sufficient conditions for the Schur stability of the FDI attacked system. The effectiveness of the proposed approach can be proved through a numerical example.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
You et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: