Standpoint Theory and Peer Disagreement within a Community Model of Knowledge

Disagreement holds a central place within standpoint theory, yet its intersection with the debate on peer disagreement has been largely overlooked. Standpoint theory emphasizes the situatedness of knowledge based on social positions – defined by factors such as gender, race, class, and other axes of identity. This fragmentation of knowledge creates a distinct challenge for traditional notions of epistemic peers as it would make epistemic peerhood, especially across identity groups, almost impossible. To accommodate this, I suggest broadening the notion of epistemic peers using a community model of knowledge. Furthermore, I explore the dynamics of peer disagreements when one interlocutor emerges from a marginalized position. In such situations, I contend that the marginalized perspective should be assigned more weight, posing a challenge to both steadfast and equal weight views. This argument culminates in the introduction of ‘Peer-Predominant Conciliationism’, a view suggesting that, under certain circumstances, it is rational to privilege a peer’s perspective over one’s own in peer disagreement.