Cybersecurity of Radiation Detection Devices: A Proof-of-Concept Attack

The integrity of radiation detection systems is critical to maintaining a robust security posture for critical infrastructure. However, as modernization introduces advanced digital capabilities, these systems become increasingly susceptible to cyber threats. Cyberattacks targeting radiation detection devices can have severe consequences for public safety and national security.This work investigates the feasibility of spoofing radiation detection systems by reverse-engineering the ANSI/IEEE N42 (N42) data format and analyzing the workflow that governs data collection and processing. This study identifies vulnerabilities that could allow an adversary to manipulate the measurements, compromising the integrity of the system. A proof-of-concept false data injection attack is demonstrated through three scenarios: modifying calibration parameters, overwriting measurement data, and recreating radiation signatures.To mitigate these threats, cryptographic controls are applied at three layers within the system threat model: file-level protections using Extensible Markup Language (XML) Digital Signature and XML Encryption for the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of N42-formatted data; firmware-level secure boot enforced by a hardware root of trust on the AMD Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 system on a chip; and data transport–level protection via encrypted UART (universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter) communication.The hardware reference design introduced in this work provides the foundation for establishing a trusted computing base for data acquisition and encrypted digital data transfer. Combined with XML Digital Signatures and XML Encryption, these capabilities incorporate a defense-in-depth strategy capable of protecting the workflow of radiation detection systems.