Making Transparency Work: FOI Officials as Relational Managers

This study examines how Freedom of Information (FOI) officials in Mexico implement transparency amid institutional fragility and growing political hostility. Drawing on in‐depth interviews with officials from three federal ministries, the article argues that FOI implementation relies not only on rules and procedures but also on the relational work FOI officials perform as they navigate multi‐directional accountability. The analysis identifies three mechanisms—trust‐building, translation, and adaptive brokerage—through which officials secure cooperation from internal departments, reassure political superiors and regulators, and maintain external credibility. The findings reveal a transparency paradox: FOI systems designed to minimize discretion depend heavily on the discretionary relational work of those who operate them. By conceptualizing FOI officials as relational managers, the study advances FOI research, extends street‐level bureaucracy theory into highly legalized domains, and highlights the often‐invisible institutional maintenance work required to “make transparency work” in increasingly challenging environments. Related Articles Lagunes, P. F. 2012. “Corruption's Challenge to Democracy: A Review of the Issues.” Politics & Policy 40, no. 5: 802–826. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00384.x . Montes de Oca Barrera, L. B. 2019. “Persistent Exclusion in Mexico: Regulatory Governance as an Imperfect Project of Political Modernization.” Politics & Policy 47, no. 1: 127–151. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12291 . Nohlen, D. 2009. “Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Consolidation of Democracy.” Politics & Policy 37, no. 1: 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00159.x .