Global subject pressure in nontheistic idealism

Helen Yetter-Chappell defends a nontheistic idealism on which physical reality is a phenomenal tapestry constituted by unity-of-consciousness relations, requiring no divine perceiver. This paper argues that her position cannot sustain anti-subjectivism without admitting a globally unifying subject-like ground. Two arguments establish the pressure: the instability of the Thin Mind view she prefers as her own answer to the subject question, and the absence of any adequate ground for the synchronic pattern of co-consciousness relations. Among the available ways to realize the required global subject, theistic idealism is comparatively superior, as the principal alternatives, cosmopsychism, primitive phenomenal field views, neutral monism, and impersonal cosmic subject views, each leave at least one of the two pressures unresolved. The argument concludes by using Yetter-Chappell’s own comparative methodology to show that on the criteria of intelligibility, explanation, and perceptual contact she uses to favour idealism over materialism, theistic idealism has the comparative advantage.