Acts and attribution of State organs under international law

Abstract This article explores the attribution of conduct to a State under international law, with a particular focus on Articles 4 and 5 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Using Lupaka Gold v Peru as a case study, it argues that attribution depends not on formal classification under domestic law but on the substantive exercise of governmental authority within the State’s legal framework. Even entities endowed with autonomy or independent legal personality may be regarded as State organs when a genuine link exists between their functions and the sovereign powers of the State. Drawing on jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice and investment arbitral tribunals, the article highlights the distinction between attribution and responsibility, showing that attribution serves as the normative bridge between factual conduct and legal consequence. It concludes that the true essence of attribution lies in identifying the substantive nexus between the State and the actor, ensuring that States cannot evade international responsibility by delegating public authority to formally independent entities.