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Analysis reveals the shift of pension asset control from members to providers, highlighting governance risks in Ireland's system.
Pension assets often represent one of the largest pools of wealth for individuals and countries, raising questions about who should control them. This paper examines Ireland’s pension system, where the rise of master trusts (primarily for-profit multi-employer schemes) has led to a significant concentration of pension assets, with authority shifted from pension members and employers to financial service providers. Surprisingly, those negatively affected from this development did not voice opposition to it. We attribute this silence to the evolving approach of the Irish Pension Authority, moving from passive to active supervision, justifying the need to consolidate assets to strengthen risk governance. Drawing on the concept of linked ecologies, we argue that this focus on risk points to co-dependencies between regulators and financial service firms, which marginalises non-financial actors within pension governance and undermines participation in financial decisions, while nevertheless mobilising their acquiescence. Being able to act in the name of risk should thus be understood as an important source of state power in financialised capitalism.
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James et al. (2026) studied this question.
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