In Defence of Oblique Intention

Recent work on lying has revived an old action‐theoretic category: oblique, or indirect, intention. I argue that some liars intend deception obliquely. Sneddon objects that this category is drastic and unjustified: it counts all foreseen side‐effects as intended. My response is that oblique intention is not mere foresight. It applies only where an agent foresees an unwanted effect, could avoid it by abandoning or altering the relevant course of action, and nevertheless accepts that effect as a required cost of pursuing her end. This distinguishes obliquely intended effects from mere side‐effects and non‐intentionally produced effects, where the agent submits to an unavoidable consequence without aiming at it in any sense. This distinction clarifies contested cases of lying. Some liars do not aim directly at deception, but neither do they merely allow it nor non‐intentionally deceive; they obliquely intend to deceive.