When coalitions marginalize opposition: from coordination to dominance in Indonesia

Majority coalitions are commonly treated as functionally neutral solutions to executive instability in fragmented presidential systems. This article argues that their institutional consequences depend on how they are governed after formation. It develops a typology of coordination-oriented, discipline-oriented, and dominance-oriented coalition governance and introduces the threshold of dominance as a second, nested contribution explaining the transition from reactive discipline to anticipatory compliance. The argument is examined through a qualitative within-system temporal comparison of four Indonesian governmental periods: SBY I (2004–2009), SBY II (2009–2014), Jokowi I (2014–2019), and Jokowi II (2019–2024). Drawing on elite interviews, parliamentary and official records, court decisions, electoral data, contemporaneous reporting, and academic scholarship, the article shows that SBY’s coalitions remained coordination-oriented despite their size, while Jokowi I developed reactive, defensive discipline. Only Jokowi II combined an oversized and integrated coalition, recurrent anticipatory adjustment, and sustained weakening of opposition and legislative oversight. The findings demonstrate that coalition size alone does not determine democratic consequences: similar institutional settings can produce bargaining, discipline, or power consolidation depending on the sequencing of presidential instruments and party responses.