Independent directors are expected to enhance transparency, yet effective monitoring requires scarce time and attention. Building on an attention-constraint view of corporate governance, this article tests whether independent directors’ multiple outside appointments weaken disclosure quality. Using a large panel of A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2023, we find that firms whose independent directors hold multiple board seats exhibit significantly greater analyst forecast dispersion, suggesting a poorer external information environment. The relation remains robust to alternative definitions of busyness, alternative information-asymmetry proxies, lagged specifications, richer controls, and firm fixed effects. Cross-sectional analyses show that the adverse association is concentrated in competitive industries, non-state-owned enterprises, and firms located in the eastern and central regions. By linking director time constraints to market-facing information quality in an emerging-market setting, the study extends the director busyness literature beyond internal outcomes and highlights board attention as a critical input to disclosure oversight.
Zhang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.