Phenomenal Prevalence Miscalibration: Extending False Consensus and False Uniqueness to Beliefs About One's Own Perceptual and Cognitive Traits

People systematically misjudge how common their own characteristics are: the false-consensus and false-uniqueness effects show that estimates of how many others share a trait are biased by whether one holds it oneself. For features of perception and cognition that people privately notice but rarely discuss — the apparent freezing of a clock's second hand, the absence of a mental image, the presence or absence of an inner voice — these misjudgments can be large and persist uncorrected for years, because the feature is never voiced and its true prevalence is unknown to the person. This conceptual review operationalizes that pattern, informally recognized as the "typical mind fallacy," as a measurable social-cognitive construct. Phenomenal Prevalence Miscalibration (PPM) — a relabeling of the Ross, Greene, and House (1977) false-consensus/false-uniqueness discrepancy for a new content domain, not a new quantity — is defined as the signed discrepancy between how prevalent a person believes a specific feature of their own experience to be and its independently measured population prevalence, for features that are rarely socially voiced. Consolidating a bridge across six literatures — perceptual, developmental, social-cognitive, metacognitive, phenomenological, and linguistic — the review introduces a taxonomy of cryptic universals, cryptic variants, and intermediate controls, sorted by the direction of prevalence error each should produce. I am explicit that neither the mechanism of silence nor the prevalence-discrepancy metric is new; the contribution is operationalization-and-extension, not discovery. The review closes by specifying the falsifiable predictions a measured PPM construct enables.