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We study a stylised model of the rise and fall of technocratic democracies: democracies that delegate policymaking to unelected technocrats. In our model, technocratic democracies arise when majorities fear losing power in the future while expecting their preferred policies to be maintained by technocrats. Such institutional arrangements can be stable, but shocks that increase the persistence of majorities or of the policies implemented by technocrats can plunge democracies into cycles of reforms, oscillating between more technocratic and more majoritarian institutions. Drawing on three case studies – central bank independence, fiscal rules, and climate policy – we illustrate how our model helps explain recent trends in industrialised democracies and how technocratic-majoritarian cycles can heighten the risk of democratic backsliding.
Gratton et al. (Tue,) studied this question.