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July 14, 2026International Journal of Constitutional Law0 citations

Article 50(1) of the TEU: The member states’ “own constitutional requirements” for withdrawal before the CJEU

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PPPolly Ruth Polak

Key Points

  • To examine how the CJEU can enforce constitutional requirements for member states withdrawing from the EU.
  • Legal analysis of article 50(1) of the TEU
  • Examination of recent CJEU case law
  • Evaluation of the constitutional implications of EU withdrawal.
  • The CJEU can establish minimum constitutional standards for withdrawal procedures.
  • A framework is proposed for treating withdrawal as balancing between treaty exit and secession.
  • Judicialization of democratic values in withdrawal notifications is supported by recent trends.

Abstract

Abstract The Court of Justice of the European Union could exercise control over a withdrawal notification under article 50(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and establish a common framework of minimum constitutional standards for exercising the right of withdrawal from the European Union (EU). To that end, the court could continue to judicialize article 2 of the TEU in line with recent case law and operationalize the value of democracy in the context of a withdrawal notification. Given the constitutional magnitude of withdrawal, the court could treat EU withdrawal as somewhere in between a treaty exit and a secession, drawing inspiration both from recent trends on democratization of treaty making and unmaking as well as from the recent constitutionalization of secessions.

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Cite This Study

Polly Ruth Polak (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a55d11a5aafca87247f827bhttps://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moag082
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