To intervene or not to intervene: the discursive construction of rogue state (non-)interventions in U.S. Congress

Why does U.S. Congress support military intervention in some cases but not others, even when similar threat narratives are used? Although both Iraq and Iran were described as rogue states pursuing WMDs, only Iraq faced military action. We argue that this divergence cannot be explained solely by material or institutional factors. Instead of investigating governmental decision-making, this article gives lawmakers a voice, too, by investigating how congressional discourse shapes the discursive realm of political possibilities. Drawing on a comparative analysis of congressional hearings, this article shows how differences in discursive convergence – the degree to which political actors produce similar meanings in their discursive agency – influence intervention politics. We find that congressional discourse – through consistent issue framing, historical analogies, and intertextual references – produced a unified narrative that legitimised intervention in Iraq. In contrast, the Iran case was marked by discursive fragmentation. The article highlights Congress’ role in enabling or constraining the political legitimacy of military action.