Proposes an integrative model explaining consciousness structure and function, highlighting individual differences.
This study proposes a hypothetical integrative framework for explaining the structure, function, and individual differences of consciousness, grounded in a three-layer semantic network consisting of the Surface Layer (emotion and concepts), Middle Layer (values), and Deep Layer (worldviews). Existing approaches to consciousness—psychology (attention and working memory), neuroscience (DMN/CEN/SN), and philosophy (subjectivity and transparency)—each illuminate only partial aspects of conscious experience and have not addressed the hierarchical organization and integrative structure of emotion, values, and worldviews. In this framework, incoherence—emergent misalignment among the three layers—triggers a threshold-dependent process that gives rise to Will (Volitional Integration), conceptualized as a transient integrative regime that re-synchronizes the meaning layers. When synchronization is achieved, a unified self-field emerges in the brain, producing the subjective experience of “being here as oneself.” Furthermore, recurrent re-input from the self-field to the Surface Layer enables cyclical updating across the entire meaning hierarchy, thereby sustaining the autonomous stream of consciousness. The model extends existing theories by concretizing GNWT’s global broadcast as meaning-structural integration, redefining IIT’s notion of integration as three-layer synchronization, and interpreting Metzinger’s transparency as the backgrounding of the meaning layers. Character (TCI) is positioned as the stable structure of the Middle and Deep Layers, and individual differences are formalized through the S/M/W dominance structure. Additionally, the study proposes a novel hypothesis regarding the severity of the arrival fallacy, predicting that individuals with W-type dominance are more susceptible to its intensification. Overall, this work presents a unified theoretical framework that accounts for the structure, function, individual differences, and breakdown of consciousness within a single integrative model.
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Yasumitsu Nakahama (2026) studied this question.
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