The concept of vulnerability and its relation to the concepts of inequality and discrimination – a review article

The concept of vulnerability is – often implicitly – assumed to enhance the protection of human rights, particularly concerning the rights to equality and non-discrimination. This article analyses the relationship between vulnerability, equality, and non-discrimination by reviewing the academic literature on this subject. Four strands of argument can be identified: The first line of argument emphasises the advantages of the concept of vulnerability compared to ‘traditional’ equality approaches, especially those closely related to the notion of non-discrimination. In contrast to the latter, vulnerability is understood as a concept that has the potential to eventually deliver substantive equality (the ‘better concept approach’). The second line of argument considers inequality or discrimination as contributors to vulnerability or vulnerability as a consequence of inequality (the ‘inequality causes vulnerability approach’). The third line of argument sees vulnerability as a problematic concept concerning the realisation of equality and non-discrimination, which may even reinforce inequalities as well as lead to discrimination (the ‘problematic concept approach’). The fourth line of argument relates the vulnerability concept to the prioritisation of certain, i.e. vulnerable, groups and individuals (the ‘prioritisation approach’).