Power-sharing between adoptability and durability insights from Lebanon and Iraq

Under what conditions do power-sharing agreements come into being? Once agreed, how might an agreement’s perceived acceptability affect its ability to deliver functional governance and durable peace? Using power-sharing provisions as our unit of analysis, and drawing from elite interviews and textual analysis of foundational documents in the cases of Lebanon and Iraq, we analyse three challenges at the nexus of adoptability and durability: bargaining constraints, time inconsistency problems, and variations in institutional strength. We show, with illustrative examples of provisions such as the design of federal units, the creation of second chambers, and efforts at deconfessionalization, adoptability is a through-line in the life of a power-sharing agreement, extending beyond the moment of adoption and affecting the long-term durability of the system. We also consider the lessons for Syria, where a political transition that might yet entail some form of power-sharing, is underway.