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Abstract Consciousness-raising groups were an integral feature of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s, and they are credited with finding a way to break through the epistemic barriers to a robust understanding of gender-based oppression. Consciousness-raising is therefore often used by feminist philosophers to explain how it is possible to arrive at knowledge about injustice and oppression in light of a variety of epistemic barriers. However, the process itself is rarely properly explored in its own right. It is therefore often unclear what it consists of and how it is meant to work. In this article, I seek to establish a philosophically rigorous account of consciousness-raising. I first unpack what consciousness-raising consisted in, as described and analysed by second-wave feminists. I then isolate what I take to be its core tenets and the mechanisms that render it a powerful epistemic tool. Then, I respond to two objections, namely the ‘intersectionality objection’ and the ‘bad company objection’, in order to further clarify what this method consists in and what its epistemic potential might be.
Ane Engelstad (Tue,) studied this question.