Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It

The basic form of the exclusion problem is by now very, very familiar. 2 Start with the claim that the physical realm is causally complete: every physical thing that happens has a sufficient physical cause. Add in the claim that the mental and the physical are distinct. Toss in some claims about overdetermination, give it a stir, and voilásuddenly it looks as though the mental never causes anything, at least nothing physical. As it is often put, the physical does all the work, and there is nothing left for the mental to do. I have purposely left that version neutral between events and properties; slightly different versions arise depending upon whether it is type or token identity that is denied. That distinction will matter a bit later on, but for now I shall continue to speak neutrally in order to bring out the overall shape of the problem. It is a forceful argument. And the primary reason for this, I think, is that it does not attempt to claim that there is something about the nature of the mental that renders it incapable of causing anything. This means that it is rather different from other worries about the efficacy of the mental, such as those that arise for Cartesian dualists, those that arise in the wake of Davidsons anomalous monism (1969), and those that arise for externalists about mental content