Fundamental rights in disguise? The interpretation of the ‘fundamental principles’ refusal ground of the European Investigation Order

This article examines how the refusal ground based on ‘fundamental principles of the law of the executing State’ in Article 24(2)(b) of the European Investigation Order (EIO) Directive should be understood within the framework of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It asks whether Member States may rely on national fundamental rights standards that go beyond the level of protection guaranteed by the EU Charter to refuse EIO requests for videoconference hearings under this refusal ground, and how this question relates to the Court of Justice’s case law, in particular the Melloni doctrine. The article argues that a broad interpretation of Article 24 would allow national constitutional rights standards to re-enter indirectly, thereby undermining mutual recognition and eroding mutual trust between Member States. The proposed narrow autonomous interpretation of this refusal ground instead safeguards mutual trust and the effectiveness of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, while still leaving room to address genuine constitutional conflicts and respect national constitutional identity. The analysis draws on a close reading of the EIO Directive, the Court’s case law on mutual recognition and fundamental rights, and recent developments concerning the use of videoconferencing in cross-border criminal proceedings.