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With Indonesia’s ascension to the BRICS+ forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa plus a growing list of nations from across the Global South) in early 2025, the expansion signifies a shift in the geopolitical balance of power, challenging the hegemony of the Global North led by the US. The resistance from the Global North against this development illustrates their push against a more equitable global economic landscape. Ironically, this hostility may foster greater cooperation among Global South nations, advancing the unfinished anti-colonial revolution of the twentieth century. Drawing on interviews with diplomats, we argue that the Indonesian state, pursuing a ‘free and active’ non-alignment policy, faces three potential diplomatic pathways: first, aligning with the Global North, reminiscent of the Soeharto era; second, aligning with the China–Russia–Iran faction of BRICS+, seen as hostile to the Global North, although this remains more perception than reality due to risks of dependency; and, third, maintaining non-alignment through dual membership in BRICS+ and Global North-dominated organisations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This third pathway aligns with Soekarno’s vision from the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference. However, hostile perceptions from the Global North appear to be inadvertently pushing Indonesia closer to the Chinese–Russian–Iranian faction within BRICS+. This faction favours more rapid, structurally transformative agendas surrounding de-dollarisation and alternative international institutions to the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation.
Waters et al. (Mon,) studied this question.