Observer-based false data injection attack resilient event-triggered control of microgrid load frequency control system

This study develops a secondary attack resilient observer-based event-triggered control (AROETC) strategy to counter false data injection (FDI) attack at the secondary measurement channel of an islanded microgrid load frequency control (LFC) system with auxiliary/virtual inertia (VI) control loop. The considered microgrid LFC system configuration consists of a local uncompromised VI control loop and a remotely located observer-based secondary controller that ensures FDI attack resilience and communication efficiency. The VI control loop employs a proposed regional pole placement (RPP)-based state feedback auxiliary controller for attaining desired VI performance. The RPP technique of the VI control strategy allows auxiliary control gain tuning by positioning the closed-loop auxiliary poles at the locations described by RPP parameters and thus ensures required auxiliary frequency regulation. Further, the secondary observer and controller gains, ensuring FDI attack resilience and prescribed performance, are derived using Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional stability analysis, considering secondary measurement channel communication delay, output-based event-triggering condition, remote secondary observer location, and deceptive frequency measurement signal model. Additionally, the impact of FDI attack and the efficacy of the proposed FDI AROETC method are validated through simulation analysis under various disturbance input profiles.