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Cyber-physical power systems integrate sensing, communication, and control, ensuring power system resiliency and security, particularly in clustered networked microgrids. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides a suitable foundation by centralizing policy, enforcing traffic isolation, and adopting a deny-by-default policy in which only explicitly authorized flows are admitted. This paper proposes and experimentally validates a cyber-physical architecture that couples three DC microgrids through an SDN backbone to deliver rapid, reliable, and secure power sharing under highly dynamic conditions, including pulsed-load disturbances. The cyber layer comprises four SDN switches that establish dedicated paths for protection messages, supervisory control commands, and high-rate sensor data streams. An OpenFlow controller administers flow-rule priorities, link monitoring, and automatic failover to preserve control command paths during disturbances and communication faults. Resiliency is further assessed by subjecting the network to a deliberate denial-of-service (DoS) attack, where deny-by-default policies prevent unauthorized traffic while maintaining essential control flows. Performance is quantified through packet captures, which include end-to-end delay, jitter, and packet loss percentage, alongside synchronized electrical measurements from high-resolution instrumentation. Results show that SDN-enforced paths, combined with coordinated multi-microgrid control, maintain accurate power sharing. A validated, hardware testbed demonstration substantiates a scalable, co-designed communication-and-control framework for next-generation cyber-physical DC multi-microgrid deployments.
Taha et al. (Wed,) studied this question.