PulseTrendingJournal ClubResearchersJournalsExplore
Instagram
HomeTrendingJournal ClubExplore
Synapse
⌘+K
Synapse
July 26, 2026Distributed Ledger Technologies Research and Practice

Strategic Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions

View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share

Authors

FWFei WuTTThomas ThierySLStefanos Leonardos

Discussion

Loading...

Member takes

Overview

Randomized trial reveals how latency and MEV access shape bidding behavior in builders, suggesting implications for market concentration.

Key Points

  • This research aims to analyze strategic incentives in the MEV-Boost auction system for Ethereum block building.
  • Developed an agent-based simulation framework to model builder behavior.
  • Applied empirical game-theoretic analysis to investigate bidding dynamics under varying latency and MEV access.
  • Compared an asymmetric market scenario with a symmetric benchmark to evaluate outcomes.
  • Builders with privileged MEV access bid less aggressively and maintain higher profit margins.
  • In asymmetric markets, these builders dominate market share, leading to reduced proposer revenue and increased centralization.
  • In symmetric markets, competitive bidding is observed, resulting in higher proposer revenue and greater decentralization.

Cite This Study

Wu et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a65a660d3aea3239cd77b64https://doi.org/10.1145/3833393
View Full Paper
Ask AI
Bookmark
Share