Resilient Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Multiagent Games Under False Data Injection Attacks

This article proposes a resilient distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithm for noncooperative games with multiple double-integrator agents who suffer from false data injection (FDI) attacks. A malicious attacker injects false data into agents’ actuators and sensors so that agents’ strategies deviate from the NE of the game with the compromised control inputs and interactive information. First, the robustness of the seeking algorithm against the FDI attacks is analyzed. Then, to mitigate the effect of the attacks on agents’ strategies, the false data injected in the actuators and sensors are regarded as extended states which can be observed by extended state observers (ESOs). Thus, a resilient NE seeking algorithm is proposed based on ESOs. The resilient algorithm can drive the system to converge to the NE without requiring any information about the nature of the attacks. An explicit criterion is given to ensure the effectiveness of the designed algorithms. An example is given to illustrate the results.