The Virtues and Vices of Scholarly Activism

Recently, there has been vigorous debate in constitutional theory about the ethics of activism in scholarship. Sparked by responses to the work of Tarun Khaitan, scholars have begun examining the ethical constraints and concerns raised when activism in pursuit of concrete social goals meets the truth-seeking mission of scholarship. An excellent contribution to this discussion has been the intervention of Adrienne Stone. She argues that, contrary to the assumption that activism is inimical to truth-seeking in scholarship, the opposite is the case. Activism may provide insight and clarity into the interpretive exercise of legal research. Whilst this may be true, it does not dissolve or answer the many vices encouraged by melding activism and scholarship as a matter of role morality. The aim of this article is to tease out exactly what some of these vices are, and how they relate to the overall role morality of both the activist and the scholar. We agree with Stone that scholarly virtue requires a commitment to the pursuit of truth, which need not involve only detached, ivory-tower theorising. However, we argue that any such pursuit of scholarly truth must be anchored in cleaving to the habit-forming standards or virtues that the role morality of scholarship demands. This role morality of scholarship may conflict with the role morality of activism, encouraging vices that threaten the ends of scholarship. Specifically, we address the vices of cowardice, inapt anger and unjust contempt. For insight to be realised, virtue must be carefully pursued, and vice actively discouraged.