Beyond managed rivalry: The non-nuclear-weapon state perspective on the future of arms control

Non-nuclear weapon states’ (NNWS) long tolerance of the arms control architecture as an interim step toward the ultimate goal of disarmament has reached a crossroads. The arms control regime has failed to contain rivalry; deterrence is further entrenched in the policies of nuclear-weapon states and their allies; while hard-won confidence-building, transparency, and risk reduction measures are increasingly weakened and distorted. The nonproliferation regime is evolving into one in which nuclear restraint is weakened, while the NNWS are still expected to invest in the credibility of a bargain that no longer appears oriented toward disarmament, or reflective of their security concerns. This article argues that good faith, as required under Article VI of the NPT, is a legal and political condition for meaningful negotiation, confidence-building, compliance, and institutional trust. We examine how the NNWS can strengthen their influence over arms control and wider non-proliferation debates by shaping agendas, contesting the legitimacy of an increasingly unequal nuclear order, and raising the political cost of inaction within and beyond multilateral forums. We contend that the NNWS should support immediate risk-reduction and verification measures without romanticizing arms control, while resisting efforts to detach such measures from longer-term disarmament obligations.