Colour constancy as counterfactual

There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711 Swift, J. 1711. “A Critical Essay on the Faculties of the Mind”. In Miscellanies in Prose and Verse, 247–259. London: Printed for John Morphew. [Google Scholar]: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature.