Ascending-Price Progressive Spectrum Auction for Cognitive Radio Networks With Power-Constrained Multiradio Secondary Users

In this paper, we investigate spectrum sharing with power-constrained multiradio secondary users (SUs) in cognitive radio networks. The scenario under consideration consists of a primary spectrum owner who runs auctions for leasing her idle channels and multiple SU bidding for winning the usage of spectrum channels. Different from existing works in the literature with an assumption of single-minded SUs, in this paper, SUs can benefit from flexible quantity of channels. In addition, since each SU is ordinarily equipped with a fixed number of radios, she cannot utilize the amount of channels that exceed her radio capacity. Moreover, each SU has a certain power limitation so that the quality of service (QoS) of her transmission may also be constrained, even though the number of allocated channels is increased. To jointly address all these challenges, a novel ascending-price progressive auction algorithm is proposed, where the spectrum allocation decisions are made by gradually increasing the unit channel price. Theoretical analyses prove that the proposed algorithm meets the properties of QoS satisfaction, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility and achieves Pareto optimality. Simulation results further demonstrate that the proposed auction algorithm can improve both the auction revenue and the social welfare, and increase the number of winning SUs compared to the counterparts.