Perks and perils of “geostrategic inbetweenness” : the EU–Russia great power competition in the “(un)common neighbourhood” and foreign policy choices of states caught in-between

Conventional wisdom has it that the “in-between” countries, especially those located between the rivalling great(er) powers, find themselves “between a rock and a hard place”, which neatly reflects the precariousness of such a geopolitical positioning, fraught with replete nasty consequences for bespoke countries' security, sovereignty and foreign policy considerations. Russia's three wars - against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, and especially the ongoing full-scale invasion since 24 February 2022) - perhaps most vividly, albeit tragically, demonstrate the perilousness of geopolitical “inbetweenness”. However, with “inbetweenness”, it is not only that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Unlike much of the research on small and weak states, liminality and margins in international relations, the study of geostrategic “inbetweenness” looks into reverse possibilities and triadic geopolitical dynamics, exploring how “in-between” states can and do defy and/or deploy their challenging geopolitical positioning against all odds. This article disentangles the sources and manifestations of geostrategic “inbetweenness” across the EU-Russia contiguous neighbours, as well as it systematises in-between states' both uniquely available and generally applicable foreign and security policy repertoires within three key strategic choices (consent, contestation or counteraction), thereby providing empirical insights from across Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus.