The probability of inevitability: The inherent impossibility of validating criteria for brain death or ‘irreversibility’ through clinical studies

A great need persists for diagnostic criteria for both brain death in young children and irreversible loss of consciousness at all ages. This article examines the inferences derived from a hypothetical confirmatory study in which all of the N patients who fulfilled the criterion did in fact experience brain death (irreversibility). A Bayesian methodology proves that, for N in the range of a large clinical study, estimations of prior probabilities are, for all practical purposes, irrelevant to the calculation of the posterior probabilities. The risk of a false positive diagnosis for the next patient who meets the criterion is approximately 1/(N + 2). The chance of at least one false positive diagnosis among the next (N + 1) patients who meet the criterion is around 50 per cent. Thus, achievement of the requisite moral certainty of a declaration of death (irreversibility) necessitates an impossibly large N for the study. This does not mean that one cannot diagnose death, but rather that the validity of the diagnostic criteria must be self-evident on a priori grounds, and that confirmatory studies are necessarily either inadequate or superfluous.