The Rights of the Minor: As Person, as Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult

Have children any (perhaps distinctive) rights? The exclusive stress on self-sufficiency and autonomy which typifies the ‘will’ or ‘power’ theory of rights, the theory that is used to question the legitimacy and usefulness of attributing rights to children, is inadequate as an expression of the moral significance of persons, particularly children. The equal moral worth of all human persons, including children, is often best protected by ensuring that they have properly protected positive rights justified in terms of their fundamental interests. The ‘interest’ theory of rights, upon which this view is based, requires us to identify which interests are to be protected and furthered by rights. In the case of children (that is, in law, ‘minors’) it is helpful to distinguish between their interests as persons (which they have in common with all other persons), as children (which they have as immature and dependent persons), as juveniles (which they develop as they approach maturity) and as future adults (which relate to their future interests as adults). This analysis enables us to refine the principle that ‘the best interests’ of the child should determine how they are treated by parents, states and others, and may lead us to give rather more emphasis to the rights of the child rather than those of the future adult.