This study examines mediation as an exercise in which the mediator has interests and operates in a context of power politics and cost‐benefit calculation. It is based on eight cases of international mediation‐the U.S.S.R. between India and Pakistan (1966), Algeria between Iran and Iraq (1975), the United States and Great Britain in Rhodesia (1975–1979), the five Western States in Namibia (1977–1983), Algeria between the United States and Iran (1980–1981), and the ongoing activities of the Organization of African Unity, The Organization of American States, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It was found that a mediator intervenes because of its interest in the conflict or in obtaining an outcome, and it can play three roles‐communicator, formulator, manipulator‐ in accomplishing its objectives. The mediator is accepted by the parties, not because of its neutrality but because of its ability to produce an attractive outcome. The mediator's power, or leverage, comes from the parties' need for a solution, from its ability to shift weight among parties, and from side payments.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Zartman et al. (1985) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched one closely related paper. Consider it for comparative context: