Beyond Neurobiological Reductionism

This paper examines the neurobiological explanatory trend in psychology, including the related and tacit roles of ontological materialism and reductionism. In addition, the role of Cartesian dualism in both psychology and cognitive neuroscience is explored. In both, the complex relationships between mind/brain and mind/body tend to be conceptualized through the framework of either ontic dualism or attribute dualism, both of which ultimately constrain notions of embodiment. Alternatively, this paper understands the body as the inseparable unity of being-in-the-world from which the Cartesian dichotomy of “mind” and “body” is abstracted. This alternative surpasses the constraints of dualism and reframes embodiment as intentionality incarnate and ultimately as “flesh.” The body, understood phenomenologically, emerges not as a “what” but as a “ what—how”—the manifestation in extension of our intentionality, the flesh of our projects in and of the world. We argue that this understanding is indispensable to a properly psychological perspective on embodiment.