Exploring Transboundary Water Conflict and Cooperation

[1] The special section on Transboundary Water Conflict and Cooperation demonstrates the use of various economic, statistical and game-theoretical approaches to the analysis of conflict and cooperation over transboundary water. They also, and perhaps more importantly, provide actual application of methodologies and their potential extrapolation to actual conflicts over transboundary water issues. Two papers, addressing the Mountain Aquifer and the Flathead Basin, demonstrate ways for dealing with a conflict situation and its possible resolution. Three other papers focus on database of signed water treaties in order to find an answer to the question on likelihood for treaty formation and factors affecting the likelihood for a conflict among riparians in a basin. [2] The interest in international water conflict and cooperation has gradually increased over the last decade. There are two possible explanations for that trend. One, water has become a subject of increased conflict and cooperation among nations. The second, communication channels have made dialogue and posting of information faster and easier. The number of books (see a review of the literature by Dinar and Dinar [2003]) and journal articles on international water conflict and cooperation have also increased and expanded in coverage. However, many of the publications [e.g., Meijerink, 1999; Kibaroglu, 2002; Beach et al., 2000; Beaumont, 1997; Huisman et al., 2000; Haddadin, 2000; Nishat and Faisal, 2000] are descriptive in nature, focusing in most cases on one river basin, explaining the nature of the conflict and the possible ways it can be solved, or has been solved, using the case study approach. [3] While there is a wealth of information on many case specific conflicts and cooperation over international water in the world, less analyses are available that attempt at generalizing and allowing for extrapolation from one case to another. Fewer publications address the generic nature of conflicts over water and their resolution, such as Barrett [2003], who developed an analytical framework to explaining international environmental treaty formation (that include also references to some water-related treaties) and existence. The special section on International Water Conflict and Cooperation aims at narrowing the gap between available information and the nature of published analysis, by giving rise to work focusing on quantitative methodological aspects of conflict resolution and cooperation and demonstrating its use in transboundary water by applying it either to an existing conflict-cooperation case or to a bigger data set of cooperative agreements. [4] The special section consists of five papers. Two papers offer conceptual frameworks for understanding conflicts among riparians to an international water body and exploring possible cooperative agreements among them. Three papers apply statistical methods to international data sets on conflict and cooperation and draw some generic lessons on the nature of conflict and cooperation among riparians, the variables affecting the formation of coalitions and the likelihood for treaty formation among these riparians. Of the five papers, two introduce the position of the riparians in the basin as a factor in reaching agreements. The geography of transboundary waters has become a subject for investigation [see Dinar, 2004] and it is reflected, using several approaches, in this special section. [5] Just and Netanyahu [2004] develop a conceptual game-theoretic framework, which helps explore potential bilateral agreements on sharing common pool resources under conditions of unequal access. The framework combines the “linking” with the “victim pays” principles and has been suggested in the past for situations where linking negotiations to other issues with reciprocal benefits may achieve international cooperation since it can avoid outcomes that are politically unacceptable due to the victim pays principle. While the introduction of the victim pays principle has been used in previous game-theoretic framework, Just and Netanyahu demonstrate how game structure and benefits, suggested by linked game theory, are altered when victim pays strategies are removed from the feasibility set. In this context, linking games is shown to have greater advantages than when the structural implications of eliminating victim pays strategies are not considered. As a result, the self-enforcing characteristics of a linked agreement are enhanced. A stylized example of sharing of the Israeli-Palestinian Mountain Aquifer is developed to illustrate how the victim pays principle may prevent sharing arrangements and optimal management when negotiated in isolation. Such an analytical framework could be considered in riparian situations where rivers cross boundaries and there is a strict upstream-downstream geography, or when terrain creates relative advantage to one riparian over the others. [6] Li et al. [2004] demonstrate the application of a status quo analysis using a dynamic graph model in a multiparty, single issue conflict within a river basin, and how the analysis can identify the possible routes of the negotiation process. The model is applied to the Flathead River conflict, involving the United States (Montana), Canada (including British Columbia and the Sage Creek Coal Company) and the International Joint Commission (IJC). The paper assesses the likelihood of various compromise resolutions in the negotiation over a development project by the coal company that is expected to negatively affect Montana. The dynamic nature of the analysis allows for obtaining useful insights regarding potential resolutions of the conflict under study and about how decision-makers' interactions may direct the conflict to distinct resolutions. Analyses also show how political considerations may affect a particular decision-maker's choice, thereby influencing the evolution of the conflict in the future. [7] Yoffe et al. [2004] propose a methodology for assembling the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database that provides a framework for their quantitative, global scale explorations of the relationship between freshwater resources and possible international conflict and cooperation. Using GIS techniques, Yoffe et al. develop a methodology to collect and incorporate current and historical data for countries in transboundary river basins, including biophysical, socioeconomic, and political variables. They combined it with historical water relations in the basins, including a methodology for identifying and classifying events among riparians by their intensity of cooperation/conflict. The global data set is then used to investigate (1) relationship between freshwater resources and international conflict and cooperation, (2) relationship between domestic and international political tensions and “risk for conflict,” and (3) relationship between external shocks such as climatic variability and international conflict and cooperation. The results show that (1) many of the factors traditionally considered to be relevant indicators of water conflict, showed no statistically significant association with international water conflict or cooperation. However, broadly defined regional institutions matter, (2) water and nonwater events are correlated at the international scale and that water events are impacted by international and domestic scales. The nature and direction of these relationships varied considerably by region, and (3) extreme conflicts but also strong cooperation are relatively frequent in regions with extreme climatic conditions characterized by high hydrologic variability. [8] Espey and Towfique [2004] develop a conceptual model to predict the likelihood of a bilateral treaty formation among riparian states. Among the factors that they consider are resource scarcity level, geography, politics, culture, and socioeconomic conditions. The assumption behind riparian behavior is that riparians view treaties as creating additional benefits. As long as expected benefits are associated with treaty formation, riparian states will sign the treaty. Espey and Towfique than apply a logistic model to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, using information on treaties that were signed over the last sixty years. The results indicate that the more significant a water basin is within a country, the more likely the country is to form a treaty regarding its management. On the other hand, the more control over the water basin any given country has, the less likely it will be involved in a treaty. Espey and Towfique suggest that economics, politics, and culture play an interactive role in dispute resolution, and should not be overlooked in efforts to address issues of international water basin management. Geographic characteristics also play an important role, defining differential resource constraints or significant control of an international river basin. [9] In the last, Song and Whittington [2004] also use the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database as a domain to which they apply their framework for investigating the success of countries in negotiating international river basin treaties. While Espey and Towfique's model focuses on bilateral treaties, Song and Whittington's model addresses also multilateral treaties. The main feature in Song and Whittington's model is a typology of international rivers, based on asymmetries in economic and political power among the riparian states. Using a multivariate analysis to predict likelihood of treaty formation, Song and Whittington reach conclusions that are similar to those reached by Espey and Towfique and other conclusions that are not in agreement with those reached by Espey and Towfique. An interesting variable, civilization type, which is somewhat similar to the religious variable used by Towfique and Espey, suggests that treaties among riparian states sharing a “western civilization” were much more likely than among riparian states in other civilizations. Geography matters in Song and Whittington's analysis, with treaties more likely among adjacent upstream/downstream or “side-by-side” riparians than among “country pairs” with other spatial relationships. [10] The five papers in this special section not only demonstrate the use of various economic, statistical and game-theoretical approaches in the analysis of conflict and cooperation over transboundary waters, but also, and perhaps more importantly, provide actual application and show the potential extrapolation to actual conflicts and their resolution in other regions. The three papers by Yoffe et al., Espey and Towfique, and Song and Whittington demonstrate, using different models, the importance of a comprehensive approach to understanding the behavior of riparian states. The authors show that both the variables directly related to the conflict and also particular background variables are significant. The papers by Just and Netanyahu and Li et al., demonstrate the usefulness of conflict-cooperation modeling in establishing a generic hypotheses that could be of great relevance in analyzing particular case conflicts and their potential resolution.