Evaluative judgments of aspects of life as a function of vicarious exposure to hedonic extremes.

In two experiments, the hypothesis was corroborated that vicarious exposure to hedonic extremes—especially the hedonically negative—results in contrast re-garding evaluative judgments of aspects of life that have evolved or been ac-quired in the course of life beyond the laboratory. In Experiment 1, participants who wrote about hedonically. negative events occurring at the turn of the cen-tury expressed greater satisfaction on a composite index of present life quality than participants who wrote about hedonically positive events. In Experiment 2, participants who wrote about hedonically negative events, personal tragedies, scored higher on a composite index of satisfaction with life, health, and physical appearance than participants who wrote about hedonically positive events. The findings for the composites corroborate a comparison level model of evaluative judgment. The findings for individual items, however, suggest that aspects of life are not evaluated in terms of a single utility scale and standard—the com-parison level. Other findings are discussed that appear to contradict a simple affective model of evaluation in which the positivity of evaluations is postu-lated to increase with the positivity of affective states. A number of psychologists have generalized perceptual (Helson, 1964) and judgmental (Volkmann, 1951) principles, corroborated in the traditional experimental psychology laboratory, to social judgment. The most well-known generalization is that of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) who proposed a theory of the evaluation of outcomes resulting from social interaction. Although outcomes might differ in their specifics, it was assumed that all outcomes could be characterized in terms of their utility or hedonic value. The com-This research was supported by grants from the