Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World

C hristina L afont has argued that the early H eidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing H eidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by J ohn H augeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of B ernard W illiams and A drian M oore), I argue that a crucial assumption that L afont and H augeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of B eing’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a H eideggerian ‘understanding of B eing’ might be like.