In spite of the universality of clientelism, it is often seen as a peculiar aspect of Third World politics, one which inevitably stifles development. This study examines clientelistic relationships in south-western Nigeria and their possible impact on rural development, with a special focus on Ibadan. It finds that rural clients attract the attention of the political class to promote the exchange of goods for loyalty through associations that afford clients a sort of cohesive power and a common front, the basis of their relevance in the political-clientelistic chain. This clientelistic chain also serves as the channel through which development projects are conceived and implemented. But since the projects provided only serve symbolic purposes, they easily collapse: clients may have the opportunity of changing patrons, but they remain subservient to the political/economic elite. Thus rural underdevelopment persists in spite of a continual inflow of development projects (and goods).
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Ọmọbọwale et al. (2010) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 2 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: