This paper investigates the driving forces behind the Korean government's real-estate policy decision-making. In particular, it tries to explain why inefficient and inequitable policies have persisted for so long, and why policy reform has been so sluggish. In order to do this, a few key regulations governing housing supply and land use are described and evaluated. These are the price control on new apartments, control on land-use conversion, green belts and spatial deconcentration policies. Next, it is demonstrated that the standard economic theory of interest-group politics is not appropriate in explaining the behaviour of the government officials in charge of these regulations. It is then suggested that a piecemeal and lukewarm approach to policy reform could be better understood in light of the behaviour of risk-averse government officials taking the political ramifications of their decisions very seriously.
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Kim et al. (2000) studied this question.
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