The proximate cause of democratic breakdown in Argentina has invariably been a military coup. In overthrowing civilian governments, however, the armed forces have not acted in a vacuum. Before the 1966 and 1976 coups, military officers made sure that key landowner, business, and labor leaders would support or at least accept military intervention. The importance that the Argentine military places on civilian opinion raises the question of the conditions under which civilian leaders might become more likely to oppose a coup. One promising development would be for these elites to channel their political demands increasingly through political parties. By investing resources in party activity and becoming more habituated to pressing demands through party channels, Argentine socioeconomic elites would gain a larger stake in the survival of the electoral and legislative institutions that parties require to be effective. This article will analyze the relationship between one such elite, the Peronist union leadership, and one of Argentina's main political parties, the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ).
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James W. McGuire (1992) studied this question.
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