The second face of security: Britain's ‘Smart’ appeasement policy towards Japan and Germany

Most states have numerous paths to create security for themselves. Foreign policy-makers must recognize that their own security policy will initiate a process that structures the nature of the domestic competition over domestic and foreign policy in other countries. I contend that one state's security alternative can empower or weaken domestic actors and interest groups in opposing foreign powers. I term this process the ‘second face of security’ since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security (in contrast to the ‘first face of security’). I apply this model to explain the intent of Britain's ‘smart’ or targeted appeasement policy during the 1930s – to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Tokyo and Berlin away from rearmament and extreme autarky.