Theory-of-mind paradigm in developmental research: a critical evaluation from phenomenological and non-Western perspectives

The theory-of-mind concept and its measurement method, the false-belief task, have dominated the field of social understanding. One reason for this situation is the historical and theoretical background of the theory-of-mind paradigm rooted in Cartesian cognitivism centred on representations. Tracing the birth of the false-belief task, this study illuminates the tacit premises of the paradigm and provides an overview of objections from phenomenological and non-Western perspectives. Arguably, the theory of the fast and slow processes of social understanding is plausible for bridging the gap between the theory-of-mind and phenomenological explanations. However, this study proposes that the two-process theory fails to satisfactorily elucidate the sociocultural construction of social understanding. The discussion provides a deeper appraisal of its sociocultural nature and a reappraisal of the Western theory-of-mind concept.