Team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for systems with slow and fast modest

This paper discusses team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for systems with slow and fast modes. It is established that the cost functions of the players in the pure slow and the full-order games have the same value in the limit as the small singular perturbation parameters tends to zero. It is shown that if the leader bases the design of his approximate strategy on the slow subsystem, while the follower bases his design on the full-order system, then the resulting solution is ill-posed. Moreover, if the fast information is incorporated in the approximate strategy of the leader, then it is shown that the singular perturbation technique of constructing approximate strategies by composing the slow and fast strategies is ill-posed and cannot be used in this problem. A new design methodology to construct approximate Stackelberg strategies by solving reduced-order problems, which have the same information structure as the full-order one, is presented. It is shown that the conditions for existenco and uniqueness of the solution of the full-order problem can be established through those conditions of the reduced-order problems. Finally, it is proved that the approximate strategies, besides being team near-optimal, possess the asymptotic Stackelberg property.