Wind Power Ramping Control Using Competitive Game

Wind power ramping events bring serious challenges to power system operations. Coordination among wind farms should be improved to mitigate adverse impacts of ramping events. A competitive game mechanism based on the noncooperative game theory is proposed to evaluate the contribution of wind farms in the competitive coordination process. Wind farms compete for participating in the schedule of virtual power plant to decrease the control errors during ramping events. The competitive coordination process depends on the wind farms regulation process affected by profit distribution. Considering power regulation quantity of wind farms and the ability to maintain power outputs, a contribution index is proposed as payoff function and evaluation tool. Furthermore, the existence of Nash equilibrium is proved by analyzing concavity of contribution index. The detailed derivation of Nash equilibrium is presented mathematically. Effective-regulation strategy is derived as Nash equilibrium among effective-regulation, over-regulation, and under-regulation strategies. Simulation results show that the competition among wind farms can reduce the control error. Furthermore, comparison among wind farms with different game strategies indicates that a larger contribution index can be obtained by choosing effective-regulation strategy which is beneficial to fulfill the schedule of virtual power plant.