Fragmented sovereignty: how Belgium’s policy paralysis undermines Europe’s China ‘de-risking’ strategy

Belgium’s internal federal structure impedes the implementation of European Union (EU) foreign policy, with consequences for the Union’s current approach to economic de-risking from China. Situating the analysis within theories of paradiplomacy and subnational diplomacy, this article identifies how overlapping jurisdictions, intergovernmental inertia, and institutional competition obstruct coherent strategic alignment between the national and the supranational level in a phenomenon we define as fragmented sovereignty, highlighting how intra-European as well as intra-member state fragmentation can undermine the EU’s ability to act as a unified global peer to China. Drawing on thematic analysis of parliamentary debates, policy documents, and elite interviews, the paper demonstrates how federal fragmentation fosters policy ambiguity, strategic vulnerability, and deflection to supranational institutions. The Belgian case exemplifies how internal state structures complicate the operationalisation of the EU’s evolving economic security agenda. In doing so, it contributes to scholarship on European foreign policy by revealing how domestic institutional fragmentation within member states limits supranational geopolitical resilience. Furthermore, this paper refines theories of fragmented sovereignty by showing how internal decentralisation interacts with supranational demands thus creating implementation gaps.