Contributions of attribution theory to the law.

For reasons best explained by him, the editor of this journal invited me, a teacher of criminal law and procedure and evidence unsophisticated in social science methodology, to comment on the potential contributions of attribution research to the law. As it turns out, I am glad he did so. The papers in this symposium are fascinating and invite lawyers to look at recurrent problems in a new way. That, in itself, is a major contribution. Beyond that; however, one can speculate about how the legal system might profitably change to take account of the intuitive psychology of humankind as exposed by attribution research. However pleasant it may be to be able to explain and-to a degree-to predict human responses, the utility of this theory, and the research it spawns, to the law must turn on the extent to which it improves the law's performance. Two major questions are raised by the work in this symposium. First, to what extent are legal conceptions of responsibility called into question by the fact that they do not accord with lay attributions? Second, to the extent that proper legal conceptions are being undercut by inappropriate attributions, what precautionary steps should be taken? Attribution research, of course, is the basis for asking these questions, for their sensible resolution, and ultimately for better performance in the administration of justice. Because questions of responsibility are at the heart of attribution research and because those questions are most regularly addressed in the law of crimes, the clearest intersection between law and attribution occurs in that arena. I, too, will confine myself to examples from the criminal law. But findings of the attributionists are of interest throughout the law. When terms ought to be implied in contracts, when risks ought to be spread in certain ways, how intestate property ought to be distributed, and