Photographic Art: An Ontology Fit to Print

A common, indeed standard, art‐ontological position is that repeatable artworks are abstract objects with multiple concrete instances.1 Since artworks in the medium of photography are widely thought to be repeatable works, it seems reasonable to identify them with abstract objects. I argue, however, that identifying photographic artworks with abstracta mistakenly ignores photography's printmaking genealogy, specifically its ontological inheritance. The products of printmaking media (prints) must be construed in a manner consistent with basic print ontology. Since the most plausible ontology of prints is nominalist, photographic artworks should be construed not as abstracta but as individual and distinct concreta. So if photography ought to inherit basic print ontology, then insofar as photographic artworks are photographs, the correct ontology of photographic art is also nominalist—it treats photographic artworks as individual and distinct concrete artworks.2 I take the standard model of repeatable work ontology, broadly construed, to be as follows: for a work to be a repeatable work, that work must be a multiply instantiable abstract object. More precisely, that work must be an abstract object (that is, a nonphysical type, individual, or particular necessarily lacking spatial, if not also temporal, location) that, in principle at least, has multiple instances (copies, tokens, embodiments), each of which is a concrete object (that is, a physical object necessarily possessing spatiotemporal location).3 So described, the repeatable work model ought to be sufficiently narrow to support the substantive philosophical discussion to come but also sufficiently broad to capture a variety of disparate, robust art‐ontological views about the nature of repeatable artworks, of which photographic art is at least standardly assumed to be a part. Given the repeatable work model, if photographic artworks are standardly repeatable, then photographic artworks are standardly multiply instantiable art‐abstracta.4 For example, if Sean Scully's Deptford Blue Door (1999) names a work of photographic art, then Deptford Blue Door names an art‐abstractum for which there can be, and in fact are, multiple (full, proper, authentic, Scully‐sanctioned or editioned) concrete instances. It follows that the physical object displayed in the art gallery, archived in the wealthy collector's flat file, or tacked to the wall of Scully's studio is not itself the artwork Deptford Blue Door, but merely a concrete instance of that photographic artwork. Moreover, the destruction of one of these instances does not itself constitute the destruction of Deptford Blue Door—vandalizing the concrete instance on display in Galeria Bernd Klüser can no more damage or destroy Deptford Blue Door than can dog‐earing the book sitting on my shelf damage the literary work Moby Dick. The destruction of an instance of Deptford Blue Door fails to constitute a metaphysical loss with respect to Deptford Blue Door, the photographic artwork.5 While this model nicely conforms to general intuitions about repeatable works imported from other repeatable work domains, it fails to tell us exactly why we should think that the standard repeatable work ontology is a good model for photographic art. What exactly about the nature of photographic art makes the model suitable for photography? One obvious source of support is what I call the inheritance principle for photographic art, which I take to be as follows: if being a photographic artwork entails being a photograph, then photographic artworks should be of the same ontic kind as photographs. Of course, this claims only that the general ontological model for photographs, whatever it is, also applies to photographic artworks. So, should one accept the standard repeatable work ontology for photographic art and also endorse the inheritance principle for photographic art, one must also accept standard repeatable work ontology for photographs. The principal question then becomes whether photographic ontology can plausibly be viewed in terms of the standard model for repeatable works—photographic art's ontological inheritance depends on the answer. Obviously, anyone endorsing the inheritance principle for photographic art alongside the repeatable work model for photographs should unsurprisingly arrive at the repeatable work model for photographic artworks. After all, if photographic artworks are photographs, then if photographic prints are not themselves photographs but merely instances of photographs, then photographic prints are not themselves photographic artworks. For instance, if the object hanging on the gallery wall is a photographic print of Robert Mapplethorpe's Tulips (1979), then that object is not a photographic artwork—it is not even a photograph—but merely a non‐art instance of the photograph that Tulips names, and it is this photograph and not its instances that is the photographic artwork. Moreover, once we suppose that the standard repeatable work model is correct, it unsurprisingly follows that the principal ontological debate becomes one between various competing views of abstracta and their corresponding existence, identity, and individuation conditions. While some customizations may look more promising than others, anyone embracing repeatable work ontology for photographs would find that the standard model for Tulips at least has the same general structure as the standard model for Moby Dick, The Wasteland, and the Eroica, and so they would find photographic works to be no stranger sort of object than literary or musical works (that is, novels, poems, symphonies, and so on—and photographs). Any further ontological debate involves competing robust models united in their assumption that repeatability tracks multiply instantiable abstracta. For example, while Saul Bellow's Herzog, Sergei Rachmaninoff's Piano Concerto No. 2, Akira Kurosawa's Ran, and Marilyn Minter's Prism may be radically divergent objects at the level of their particulars, insofar as novels, concertos, films, and photographs are repeatable works as standardly conceived, all belong to the same general ontic kind. The above should provide a rough yet informative characterization both of the standard ontological terrain with respect to repeatable works as well as the scope and limits of photographic ontology taken to be contained therein. In the next section, I provide an alternative ontological model for photography also derived from an ontological inheritance principle, not between photographic art and photography, but instead between photography and printmaking. The standard repeatable work model for photography derives the bulk of its prima facie plausibility from an implicit and illicit ontological bootstrapping. Construing photographs according to the standard repeatable work model makes sense only in a selectively backward direction—first endorsing the inheritance principle for photographic art and then working backward from photographic art to photography. There is, however, another starting point from which we can proceed in a forward rather than backward fashion. I propose another inheritance principle, according to which photography ought to inherit basic print ontology. Basic print ontology, I claim, is nominalist—the works of printmaking (that is, the products of printmaking forms, processes, or techniques) are concrete, individual, and distinct prints. So, given that photography is a form of printmaking, no less so than other printmaking forms (for example, intaglio, lithography, relief printing, aquatint, silkscreen, sugar lift, gum printing, and the like), being a photograph entails being a print. Just as a lithograph is the print product for lithography, a photograph is the print product for photography (that is, the print product of photographic processes). From this, it follows that photography ought to inherit basic print ontology, and so photographic ontology is nominalist—works of photography are concrete, individual, and distinct photographs. If being a photographic artwork entails being a photograph, then photographic art should inherit photographic ontology, and so the ontology of photographic artworks is also nominalist—works of photographic art are concrete, individual, and distinct photographic artworks. To be a print is to be the individual and distinct concrete product of a printmaking process (typically operating over a template and onto a support). Furthermore, prints are characterized according to and have their character largely determined by the processes of which they are the products (for example, a lithograph is the print product of the printmaking process known as lithography, a screen print is the print product of the printmaking process known as screen printing, and so on). Most importantly, being a print itself entails neither being a copy nor being a reproduction. That is, prints are individual, distinct works, and this fact nevertheless remains consistent across the vast majority of printmaking processes, save the varieties of monotyping, being capable of producing multiple (what I call) relevantly prints. of my depends on my to capture intuitions about the repeatability of photography to photographs as multiply instantiable abstracta. To this I the of prints are relevantly to each other if and only if they all in in of a a if and only if they are from the same template (for example, a particular by the same process (for example, onto the same support (for example, that the is not a for the it as the While standard repeatable work ontology as abstract of which concrete objects can be tokens, to models the repeatable of printmaking a corresponding in the of objects To be one may to of which concrete prints may be however, abstracta is not by the basic print ontology as basic printmaking ontology is there be no as an abstract object. In to forward photographic artworks, we can to yet another inheritance principle, one between prints and photographs. to the inheritance principle for photography, if being a photograph entails being a then photography should inherit the basic print ontology. From this, we can basic print ontology to photography. A print is the individual and distinct concrete product of a printmaking process to which other individual and distinct concrete products of that printmaking process may be relevantly Of course, not all printmaking processes multiple relevantly while by For instance, in monotyping, the to the from the template onto the support the on the so that to be the product of a process is to be a print to which no other print can be relevantly processes, capable at least in principle of producing multiple relevantly are to multiple prints. For instance, in the is in each from the same template so as to a of prints of To be the product of a process is to be a print to which no other even that is relevantly in printmaking seems to printmaking processes that are if not also to multiple relevantly prints. Given the inheritance principle for photography, it follows that a photograph is the individual and distinct concrete print product of a photographic process (that is, the printmaking process of to which other individual and distinct concrete print products of that printmaking process may be relevantly Of course, not all photographic processes multiple relevantly by For instance, for no of the photographic onto another be the product of a process is to be a photograph to which no other photograph can be relevantly photographic processes, capable at least in principle of producing multiple relevantly photographs, are to multiple photographs. For example, while are to photographs, the photographic processes they are capable at least in principle of producing multiple relevantly photographs (that is, that, while to and with or the photographic nevertheless in principle be to multiple relevantly photographs). To be the product of a photographic process is to be a photograph to which no other photograph is relevantly there in principle be photographs. in photography seems to photographic processes that are if not also to multiple relevantly photographic prints. So, if the of basic print ontology to photography is that to be a photograph is to be a photographic then it follows that repeatability for photography, as for printmaking, does not some further object (that is, some but instead more than the of work model of photographic photographic artworks are multiply instantiable instances are concreta. principle for photographic art photographic art basic photographic being a photographic artwork entails being a photograph, so photographic artworks belong to the same ontic kind as photographs. principle for photography photography basic print being a photograph entails being a so photographs belong to the same ontic kind as prints. Basic print ontology a print is the individual and distinct concrete product of a printmaking process to which other individual and distinct concrete products of that printmaking process may be relevantly of the above prima facie however, taken they form an from which only and can To this, that there be some object that is a photographic artwork (that is, a photograph that the for being art, whatever may From the it then follows that there be some object that is both an abstract object and a concrete both a print and not a both a photograph and not a photograph, and both a photographic artwork and not a photographic artwork. Obviously, there be no object. So, from the assumption that there be photographic artworks, it follows that there not be photographic artworks. the above of claims is an and so endorsing all of its claims is Given the principal ought to be on which of the claims we must so as to the position is that of the of photographic art must be consistent with the contained in basic print ontology and the inheritance principle for both photography and photographic art. That is, I take the of basic print ontology with that of both inheritance to be prima facie so the only to is to the repeatable work model for photographic art. what for is that competing endorsing the repeatable work model for photographic art must find a plausible to basic print ontology, the inheritance principle for photography, or the inheritance principle for photographic art. In basic print ontology, one accept both inheritance but that what the correct of basic print ontology is not my model, but rather the standard repeatable work model, the of photographic ontology all the this the principal not with photographic artworks as abstracta according to the standard repeatable work model, but instead with the of the ontology of printmaking according to my So, by the we the in a manner that is consistent with both inheritance The with this is that the standard repeatable work model for both photography and photographic art entails basic print ontology as I have The work of photographic prints (that is, instances proper, or in the repeatable work model of photographs and photographic artworks can only be if the ontological model for photographic prints a So, if the standard repeatable work model for photographic art makes sense only insofar as it that photographic prints are concrete then the of basic print ontology the standard repeatable work model for photographic art to it with some model as For the standard repeatable work ontology to be even prima facie plausible for photographic art, basic print ontology must be as the repeatable work model for photographic art is basic print ontology is no than endorsing basic print ontology. Of course, this all that it is to basic print ontology a and of the standard and the of printmaking. one that of printmaking ontology must nominalist, one nevertheless the inheritance principle for photography. That is, one the that photography is a of printmaking so as to that photographs are prints. would one to that there is no ontological inheritance from printmaking to photography, and that the repeatable work model for photographic art by the photographic art at the printmaking the inheritance principle for photography also to the of photographic and of the repeatable work model for photography is the inheritance principle for photography must find a to photographic and on other than photography's printmaking must also a rather sort of that the vast majority of the (that is, gallery and so have all the of a of and not only for of the of art and printmaking, but also for the of photography as a In to with the photography and printmaking one instead to the inheritance principle for photographic art. That is, one that art‐ontological not of more or and we not suppose that photographic art must have the the of its ontological inheritance determined at the level of the this ought to be that the most plausible ontology of photographic artworks may all over from photographic ontology. So, even we the inheritance principle for photographic art as we should not to it in endorsing basic print ontology and the inheritance principle for photography, a then that we the inheritance principle for photographic art so as to the repeatable work model for photographic art. to art‐ontological that at the with the of a endorsing a position with respect to photographic art, the inheritance principle for photographic art seems to the of photographic artwork. That is, in to the inheritance principle for photographic art, one must the of photographic art, that an being a photographic artwork no entails that being a photograph (that is, that for an object to be a photographic artwork that object no be a photograph at all, a photograph that the for being an whatever may To this, the of the of photographic for an object to be a photographic artwork is for that object to the for being an artwork may to be a multiply instantiable abstract and to to photographs (for example, its instances to be photographs themselves more its instances to at least in with photographs, instances not themselves be photographs). a the ontology of photographic art must be if not and by rather than photographic Given the if not and non‐art the ontology of photographs, the ontology of photographic art be a of an ontological inheritance from non‐art photographs photographic artworks are distinct from non‐art works of photography. Just as we not suppose that and Blue is an object of the same ontic sort as a non‐art we not photographic artwork and as the same ontic sort as the non‐art photographs of Just as take or and to be distinct from their we also ought to their products to that So, if the inheritance principle for photographic art must be for the repeatable work model for photographic art to be plausibly then we ought to the inheritance principle for photographic art. The should be Any the of the inheritance principle for photographic art can be and substantive only insofar it entails a of photographic art that is itself and substantive least more so than the prima facie of photographic art by the inheritance principle for photographic Moreover, the inheritance principle for photographic art, consistent with there being photographs that instance photographic artworks, nevertheless entails that objects in the of photograph be in the of photographic artwork photographs are and photographic artworks are then there can be no photograph that is itself a photographic artwork. A rather of this is that being a photograph and being photographic art must be even what it is to be a photographic artwork has to with what it is to be a photograph being a photographic artwork does not being a photograph but rather being That photographs and photographic artworks are to a and substantive of photographic art and yet are to be distinct rather so at an some sort of art‐ontological in of the repeatable work model for photographic art is that even if one to find a to the repeatable work model for photographic art while as to the this would with respect to the ontology of photography and printmaking. Any of photographic art can be informative and only given a of photography and printmaking capable of the for photographic art and its various a ontology for photography and printmaking, according to which the of concrete works of photography can be with abstract works of art to to the for and to photographic artworks as photographic in the the repeatable work model for photographic art to some level of in at least one of if not there are no be photographic artworks, prints are not concrete or photographs are not prints. So, a as to why we ought to think photographic artworks and photographs are sufficiently to the in ontic the standard repeatable work model for the ontology of photographic artworks to be of an Just the of the same to the art products of other printmaking processes as For instance, being a artwork (for example, on a and entails being a lithograph that the for being art. To that artworks are not or that even may be artworks, no lithograph may be a artwork seems for photography, photograph, and photographic artwork. The only plausible model for the ontology of photographic art is the only plausible model for the ontology of photography and is the only plausible model for the ontology of printmaking. That model is the model, according to which photographic artworks, photographs, and prints are concrete objects to which other concrete objects may be relevantly the that the standard repeatable work model but is that the repeatability of photographic art is, but the between One of the for the standard repeatable work model is that repeatable works as abstracta with we about they are so construed, we not plausibly to and capture the substantive and at For example, and I both to have Moby Dick, or Mapplethorpe's we are not to a to the same physical object. we are both to have the same work in of in some or other to one of that instances. Most importantly, the instance in not be the same instance in my that is, we are not to have the same to have the same book or to have at the same photographic print The standard then is that which does fails to capture the repeatability of of works by a rather In what I a in which my model can these to be sufficiently of a more general from which be most least of the in a variety of some more than That while I think that the to the photographic in some the photographic print in other and the photographic in yet other I also think that or can be rather by basic For example, the I have photographs of all of which are I have photographs of all of which are the I take a standardly to a photographic and as the less have photographs of ought to between the more of and I have photographic each of which a photographic of distinct from that by other of photographic prints. I have photographic each of which the same photographic of from that by other of photographic prints. the I photographs of all of which are I photographs of all of which are the I that a standardly a (for example, a a process (for example, over a (for example, onto which some or is and from which further products may be or (for example, and so on). Given this, and an broad and narrow can be more as the I and so or the same over the same (for example, or a (for example, that each of the photographic a photographic of distinct from that by I the same over the same that each of the photographic a photographic of from that by the above and we can with what at may to be some of For example, the I that the for which I at a are in fact photographs in of a I my photographs at the so I should them on the in is neither some about as a of photograph nor that the themselves photographs. I take the more to I that the for which I at a are in fact the of in (that is, some of which are the I that the in does not take to be photographs for photographs (for example, I my at the so I should it on the more ought to be I the photographic photographic from my (that is, the photographic of at that so I should the photographic prints (that is, the photographs from that photographic on What most for my is that of the above as abstracta of the prima facie plausible for what to Of course, one that we must to abstracta in to capture a and substantive of The of my then is to it can capture the repeatability of photographic works in a manner consistent if not the various and photographs and photographic artworks, all to identifying works with multiply instantiable abstract objects. that my for the repeatability of photographs in terms of the between photographic prints. That is, the principal for of photographic works as standardly repeatable works is by the of works are standardly repeatable works photographic processes standardly multiple relevantly photographs. For example, the I have that same photograph on my wall at I have that same photograph but in and I have in my and they are all the I have in my and they are all I have photographic artworks by and they are all the I have photographic artworks by and they are all the we the That photograph is relevantly to the photograph I have on my wall at I have a photograph relevantly to that photograph for its and I have photographs in my and they are all relevantly to one I have photographs in my and are relevantly to of the I have individual and distinct photographic artworks by (for example, and each of which is an individual and distinct photographic artwork and each of which is relevantly to one another least they are relevantly to more photographic artworks, as in the I have individual and distinct photographic artworks by (for example, The Door (1999) and and of which is relevantly to the each may be relevantly to photographic artworks other than for example, The Door (1999) and and so not only does sense of the in which we about photographs and photographic artworks at no point identifying of the objects with but in a of the and photographic artworks seems in fact to be to as as they are taken to be abstracta. The is that the standard ontological model for repeatable artworks onto photographic art may capture photographic art repeatable but only by to capture photographic art repeatable work ontology fails to provide an model for the ontology of photographic artworks standard repeatable work ontology fails to be an model for basic print ontology. Any ontology of photographic artworks must be from the and in the A print is an individual and distinct concrete object to which other individual and distinct concrete objects (that is, other may be relevantly are individual and distinct prints to which other individual and distinct prints (that is, other may be relevantly for of relevantly one is a photograph if and only if the other is a artworks are individual and distinct concrete photographs to which other individual and distinct photographs (that is, photographic may be relevantly for of relevantly photographs, one is a photographic artwork if and only if the other is a photographic artwork. artworks, photographs, and prints are all in a sense standardly repeatable works photographic artworks, photographs, and prints are all standardly works to which other photographic artworks, photographs, and prints may be relevantly (that is, printmaking processes standardly multiple relevantly a the standard ontological model for repeatable works but imported photographic art the of repeatability in that standard model (that is, multiple is not the of repeatability in basic print ontology (that is, If photographic art has an printmaking ontological inheritance is then of photographic art that its print fails to be an of photographic