A central though rarely articulated premise of many election laws and much democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be rational rather than irrational-that they should reflect the true, reasoned, and informed choice of the people.Unfortunately, as political scientists have shown, people do not always vote rationally. 1 They often vote on the basis of incomplete information, 2 or without understanding election issues, 3 or in response to factors unrelated to the candidates' fitness for office. 4Some observers believe that the irrationality that characterizes many voters and many election results is caused by the presence of an excess of money and irrelevant information in the campaign process. 5 These observers argue that abuses of the electoral process can be cured by legislation restricting the amount of money that can be spent and the kind of information that can be distributed during a campaign.6These restrictions, so their proponents argue, would remove certain incentives of irrational voting, thereby enhancing the rationality of electoral outcomes.Faced with the reality of irrational voting behavior, courts, acting both independently and in cooperation with legislatures, have in certain contexts attempted to promote rational voting.In the areas of ballot placement, 7 electioneering, 8 disclosure, 9 and fair ' See infra notes 2-4, 25, 40-42 and accompanying text. 2
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James A. Gardner (1984) studied this question.